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1 INTRODUCTION 
Food marketing in Western countries has evolved from simple exchange processes 
at local markets into complex food marketing systems. Food marketing has also 
changed in other countries as a result of trends in consumer behaviour, new 
marketing methods, and a changing economic order. 
Food marketing takes place within a specific network of institutions. In open 
markets the structure of this network is determined by factors related to marketing 
effectiveness, efficiency and equity. Occasionally enterprises have voluntarily 
established common marketing institutions, such as cooperatives, in order to 
improve marketing performance. Sometimes marketing institutions, for instance 
marketing boards, are imposed on a food marketing system by a government. In 
some countries the government enhances the establishment of common marketing 
institutions through subsidies or tax facilities. 
This paper addresses voluntary marketing institutions established by enterprises of 
their own free will. We define a voluntary marketing institution (VMI) as a 
marketing institution which is voluntarily established by enterprises, and whose 
services are used by enterprises at their own discretion within the bounds of the 
formal relationship between enterprise and VMI. VMIs traditionally play an 
important role in Western food marketing systems. Examples are farmers' 
cooperatives, wholesaler sponsored voluntary chains and franchise organisations. 
The role of VMIs is changing as a result of changing markets and marketing 
strategies. 
Marketing institutions have been studied at length in the agricultural marketing 
literature. Marketing textbooks (e.g. Kohls, Uhl, 1990) offer an in depth treatment of 
marketing boards, marketing orders/agreements and cooperatives. In particular 
marketing boards and cooperatives have been investigated extensively. Marketing 
boards have been studied regularly (e.g. Morley, 1967; Hoos (ed.), 1979; Forbes, 
1982; Meulenberg, 1986; Veeman, 1997; Wallace and Schroder, 1997). There is a 
continuous stream of research on farmers* cooperatives (e.g. Cobia (ed.), 1989; 
Nilsson and Van Dijk (ed.), 1997; Van Bekkum and Van Dijk (ed.), 1997). This 
paper takes a more general look at these marketing institutions by focusing on VMIs 
as a class of marketing institutions of which marketing boards and cooperatives are 
important members. It is not our intention to offer an up-to-date picture of VMIs. 
Rather we analyse general characteristics of VMIs and present structural 
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developments of VMIs as a result of a changing marketing environment and 
marketing strategies. In particular we intend to contribute to the understanding of 
VMIs by: (a) reviewing theories and research results from economics and marketing; 
(b) proposing a classification scheme of VMIs and a set of criteria to assess the 
viability of VMIs; (c) analysing the evolution of VMIs in western food markets. The 
proposed classification scheme and assessment criteria are also applicable to VMIs 
in non-western countries. Their relevance will increase with market liberalisation, 
which will enhance a further shift from public to voluntary marketing institutions. 
Our paper is organised as follows. First, a concise description of VMIs in western 
food markets is given. Second, concepts and findings of economic theory and 
marketing relevant to VMIs are reviewed. A classification scheme of VMIs and a 
framework for assessing the viability of VMIs are proposed. Next, main trends in the 
Western marketing environment and in the enterprises of food marketing systems 
are described. The impact of these trends on VMIs in Western food markets is 
analysed. Some conclusions close the paper. 
2 VOLUNTARY MARKETING INSTITUTIONS IN WESTERN MARKETS, A 
CONCISE DESCRIPTION1 
VMIs are operating in many food marketing systems. They perform specific 
marketing functions, such as price discovery, or even perform the complete 
marketing operation for an agricultural/food product. 
Cooperative auctions contribute to price discovery in agricultural markets. Dutch 
auctions (auction starts at an offer price higher than any bidder is willing to pay, 
which is lowered until a bidder accepts the offer) are used in markets for fresh 
horticultural products: flowers, fruit and vegetables and fish. English auctions 
(auctions start at a low offer price; bids are publicly made; the bidder who makes the 
highest bid receives the goods) are used among other things to sell cattle. Auctions 
also fulfil an important logistical function by concentrating physical supply and 
demand. 
Product differentiation and relationship-marketing diminish opportunities for selling 
through auctions, since in selling through an auction no special relationship between 
supplier and buyer can be developed. On the other hand, better communication 
facilities increase the access to the auction process, and therefore the opportunity for 
auctioning products at an international scale. 
Futures markets, sometimes established with the support of enterprises operating in 
the relevant agricultural sector, have been popular in the US for a long time as an 
institution for hedging price risks for commodities such as corn, soybeans and 
wheat. In Europe commodity futures exchanges are still of limited importance, but 
various developments are stimulating the interest in commodity futures trading: 
• the trend towards big and specialised farms which operate in more open markets 
and receive less price support, e.g. by the CAP (Common Agricultural Policy) of 
the EU; 
• bigger food companies, which are concerned about price volatility of their 
agricultural inputs. 
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In many European countries, such as France, Germany, Hungary, Netherlands, Spain 
and the United Kingdom, commodity futures markets have been started, or will start 
soon. 
Various marketing institutions market agricultural products on behalf of 
participating farmers. Important institutions in this respect are agricultural 
cooperatives and marketing boards, see Table 11.1. 
Table 11.1 Market shares of agricultural co-operatives in the EUn 
farket shares(%) Dairy Fruit & Meat Farm Credit Grain 
vegetables inputs 
87 
49 
20 
75 
69 
15 
70 
60 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Austria 
Portugal 
Finland 
Sweden 
U.K. 
50 
93 
55-60 
20 
35 
49 
100 
38 
80 
70-96 
90 
83-90 
94 
99 
98 
70-90 
20-25 
60 
12-51 
15-40 
35-50 
-
41 
-
35 
-
35 
« 
60 
35-45 
20-30 
66-93 
30 
5-30 
20 
27-88 
30-70 
10-15 
25-30 
40-50 
50 
-
68 
79-81 
+ 20 
64-59 
50-60 
-
50-60 
70 
15 
75-95 
84 
-
-
40-60 
75 
20-25 
34 
75 
20 
l)
 Source: Bekkum, O.F. van, and G. van Dijk (eds.), 1997, p.29. 
Agricultural cooperatives started out as organisations, which tried to improve 
farmers' product prices by increasing the bargaining power of farmers, or through 
better product quality. They are defined as user-owned and user-controlled 
businesses that distribute benefits on the basis of use (Barton, 1989). Three concepts 
distinguish cooperatives from other businesses: a) the user-owner principle: persons 
who own and finance the cooperative are those who use it, b) the user-control 
principle: control of the cooperative is by those who use the cooperative and c) the 
user-benefits principle: benefits of the cooperative are distributed to its users on the 
basis of their use. Cropp and Engelsbe (1989) indicate potential classifications of 
cooperatives based on functions performed, structural arrangements, organisational 
or financial structure. 
The shift towards market orientation in food marketing requires cooperatives to 
adopt a customer oriented marketing policy. A cornerstone of such a policy is an 
agricultural supply of farmer-members which fits well with the marketing strategy of 
the cooperative processing/marketing company. Farmers' willingness to invest in the 
cooperative, in particular in its markets and R&D, is also essential for such a policy. 
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Adoption of modern marketing and management procedures by cooperatives 
influences the cooperative structure. The following organisational changes, partly 
due to the shift toward market orientation, can be observed: 
• size of enterprise is increasing, 
• quality of management is improving and the rights and responsibilities of top 
management are better defined, 
• special financial structures are developed to generate the necessary risk-bearing 
capital for the cooperative enterprise, 
• some cooperatives have transformed their enterprises into limited companies, 
whose shares, at least a majority of shares, are in the hands of the cooperative 
union/farmer-members. 
The above developments enhance a more rational and less emotional relationship 
between farmers, in particular young and modern farmers, and their cooperative. 
In various countries agricultural marketing boards and commodity boards contribute 
to the marketing of food and agricultural products of a sector. Marketing boards 
which are responsible for the total marketing operation of an agricultural/food 
product are the exception rather than the rule in Western countries. However, 
promotional boards which support the marketing of generic food products have been 
set up in many European countries. Sopexa in France and CMA in Germany are 
examples. Product differentiation and large size of enterprises stimulate marketing 
efforts for the brand of individual enterprises at the cost of marketing efforts for the 
generic product of a sector. On the other hand, new marketing problems emerge for 
some food products (e.g. a poor image of meat) which have to be tackled by 
marketing activities of the sector. 
3 THEORIES AND RESEARCH RESULTS FROM ECONOMICS AND 
MARKETING 
Voluntary marketing institutions (VMIs) perform functions and coordinate processes 
in food marketing systems. Their role in western food markets is changing. Theories 
and research results from economics and marketing are instrumental in 
understanding this changing role. In this section some important theories and 
research results are briefly reviewed from the perspective of their relevance to 
VMIs. 
3.1 CONTRIBUTIONS FROM INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 
Economic theory defines institutions in different ways. Schotter (1994, p.5, ff.) 
distinguishes the following three meanings of institutions: "....conventions, sets of 
rules that constrain the behavior of social agents in particular situations, and an 
organization -usually a large, well-established organization". Coriat and Dosi give a 
similar classification (1998, p.6): ".. formal organizations, patterns of behaviours 
that are collectively shared, negative norms and constraints". VMIs are either 
formal, well established, organisations or sets of rules, norms or constraints. 
For the analysis of VMIs it is useful to make a distinction between institutions 
dealing with the institutional environment (rules of the game) and institutions of 
governance (the play of the game), since the evolution of both types of institutions 
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differs substantially in food marketing. The scheme of social analysis in four levels 
proposed by Williamson (1998, p.26) also seems helpful to understand different 
types of VMIs: 1) the social embeddedness level, where the norms, customs, mores, 
traditions, etc. are located. 2) the institutional environment..., the rules of the game 
within which economic activity is organised, the polity, judiciary, and bureaucracy 
of government 3) the institutions of governance - second order economising applies: 
get the governance structures (markets, hybrids, firms, bureaus) right 4) from 
discrete structural to marginal analysis... the level with which neo-classical 
economics and, more recently, agency theory has been concerned. Williamson 
argues that New Institutional Economics is concerned in particular with levels 2 and 
3 of his scheme. The analysis of VMIs is also in particular concerned with the levels 
2 and 3, of Williamson's scheme of social analysis: the institutional environment and 
the institutions of governance. 
According to Coriat and Dosi (1998, p.6, ff.): " ....institutions not only 'parameterize' 
and 'constrain', but, given any one environment, also shape the 'visions of the world', 
the interaction networks, the behavioural patterns, and, ultimately, the very identity 
of the agents." They make a distinction between weak and strong institutionalism: " 
...ranging from weak forms retaining a lot of the canonic microfoundations to strong 
forms wherein institutions have much more life of their own and also much more 
influence on what microentities think and do." The former type of institutionalism is 
characterised by: "(1) Role of institution; parameterize system variables; contain 
menu of strategies. (2) "Primitives" of the theory: ....rational self-seeking agents; 
institutions as derived entities. (3) Mechanisms of institution-formulation: Mainly 
intentional, "constitutional" processes, (4) Efficiency properties: Institutions perform 
useful coordinating and governance functions;...". Our approach to VMIs is, in the 
terminology of Coriat and Dosi (op cit. p.8), primarily "weak" institutionalism, since 
enterprises in Western food marketing systems evaluate their participation/ 
cooperation with a VMI increasingly on the basis of rational criteria. 
Theories focusing on rules and organisational structures at macro-level may be 
useful in the analysis of VMIs. An example is the discussion of corporatism by 
Visser and Hemerijck (1997, p.65, ff.): "Corporatist governance has two analytically 
distinct properties: the degree of institutional integration of organized interests into 
the framework of public policy formation; and the degree of societal support for 
corporatist policies offered by organized interests." The authors classify corporatist 
institutional change on the basis of these two criteria. The analytical scheme for 
analysing corporatism by Visser and Hemerijck (op cit.) seems helpful to 
characterise a VMI and to derive warranted strategies. 
Discussions about market- and non market regimes also offer food for thought about 
VMI policies. Wolf (1993, p.87) summarises market failures as externalities and 
public goods, increasing returns, market imperfections, distributional inequity 
(income and wealth). He describes non-market failures as disjunction between costs 
and revenues, redundant and rising costs, internalities and organisational goals, 
derived externalities, distributional inequity (power and privilege). The analysis of 
VMIs can profit from economic theories about the failures of market and non-
market institutions at the national/sector level. In particular these theories may be 
helpful in understanding the influence of externalities of production and marketing 
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on new opportunities for VMIs, and the influence of internalities and organisational 
goals, as well as distributional inequity (power and privilege) on policies and 
management of VMIs. 
3.2 CONTRIBUTIONS FROM INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS. 
A centre-piece of industrial economics theory is the well known transaction cost 
economics theory of Williamson. This theory regards the firm as a governance 
structure. It is based on (e.g. Williamson, 1989, 1998) the behavioural assumptions 
of bounded rationality and opportunism and considers frequency, uncertainty and 
asset specificity to be principal dimensions of transactions. Williamson (e.g. 1989, 
p. 146; 1998, p.37, ff.) proposes a scheme for the analysis of contracting, which starts 
out by determining the degree of asset specificity. In the case of asset specificity 
safeguards might be provided, such as penalties to prevent a breach of the contract, 
or the transactions might be organised under unified ownership. Information is 
considered a prime source of transaction costs, in particular as a result of 
specialisation in production and marketing (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1989, p.64). 
Nooteboom (1998, p. 172) argues that the transaction costs economics theory of 
Williamson is not complete, because it is comparative, static and not dynamic: it 
does not take learning into account. In order to integrate the outlooks of transaction 
cost economics and IMP(Industrial Marketing and Purchasing, Hakansson, 1982) 
Nooteboom makes a distinction between egotistic and non-egotistic sources for 
cooperation both at the macro- and micro level, see Figure 11.1. 
Macro Micro 
Egotistic coercion or fear of sanctions 
from authority (god, law) 
material advantage or 
"interest" 
Non-
egotistic 
ethics: values/norms of 
proper conduct 
bonds of friendship, kinship 
or empathy 
Figure 11.1 Sources of cooperation between companies according to Nooteboom 
Source: Nooteboom (1998, p. 174). 
He argues that while the New Institutionalist transaction cost economics focuses on 
the egotistic sources, Neo-Institutionalism aims at incorporating the non-egotistic 
sources. 
In a review of transaction costs analysis in marketing research Rindfleisch and 
Heide (1997) conclude that firms seek to minimise transaction costs through vertical 
integration when faced with the need for safeguarding specific assets invested in an 
exchange relationship. They conclude also that the role of governance as a means of 
adapting to uncertain environments receives mixed support. Concepts and theories 
of transaction cost economics contribute to our understanding of VMIs (see for 
instance: Zylbersztajn, 1996). Transaction costs influence enterprises' decision about 
whether or not to establish a VMI. Transaction cost economics also improves our 
understanding of the type of relationship between enterprises and their VMI. Asset 
specificity and information dissemination are important in this respect. "Non 
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egotistic" factors seem relevant to VMIs which have strong social/emotional links 
with participating enterprises. 
Integration is associated with increasing levels of asset specificity, difficulty of 
performance evaluation and uncertainty (e.g. Anderson and Schmittlein, 1984; 
Lilien, 1979). Other reasons for vertical integration include ownership and complete 
control over neighbouring stages of production or distribution (e.g. Porter, 1980), the 
creation of barriers to entry for competitors (Bain, 1956), and the acquisition of 
private information (Perry, 1989, p.208). 
Between vertical integration and anonymous spot market exchange there is a great 
variety of vertical "controls" between firms at different stages of the marketing 
channel. For example, vertical contractual relations, such as quantity dependent 
pricing, ties, royalties, requirement contracts and exclusive dealing, resale customer 
restraints, resale price restraints (Katz, 1989, p.656, ff.) are used to improve profits 
in vertical marketing relationships. Concepts and theories on integration and vertical 
contractual relations are relevant to enterprises' decision making about outsourcing 
functions to a VMI. 
Models have been developed which are concerned with aspects of the relationship 
between a principal and his agent, e.g. models on moral hazard, incentives to agents 
and monitoring of agents (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1989, p.67). Models have also 
been proposed which search for a wage structure that stimulates agents' efforts. 
Free-rider problems and the division of proceeds from a joint output have been 
investigated. Principal-agent models, such as those concerned with moral hazard, 
giving incentives to agents and monitoring agents, are instrumental in analysing the 
relationship between VMIs and participating enterprises. 
Reputation has been recognised as an important asset of enterprises, in particular 
when it is impossible or too expensive to sign comprehensive contracts (Holmstrom 
and Tirole, 1989, p.76, ff.). In that case reputation offers an implicit promise for a 
fair fulfilment of a contract when unexpected events occur that are not covered by 
contract. Since mutual trust is extremely important for the relationship between a 
VMI and its target enterprises, the reputation of a VMI is a valuable asset for a 
successful relationship with the related enterprises. 
3.3 CONTRIBUTIONS FROM MARKETING THEORIES. 
The role of marketing institutions in the channel has been a central topic of 
marketing theory. Meulenberg (1997) reviewed major contributions from marketing 
theory in this field, using the classification of marketing schools by Sheth et al. 
(1988). 
It is not surprising that in particular the institutional school, focusing on "...the 
organizations that actually perform the functions required to move the goods from 
the producer to the consumer" (Sheth et al., 1988, p.74), contributes in particular to 
the theory of marketing institutions. Many scholars have analysed marketing 
channels and marketing institutions from the efficiency point of view (Alderson, 
1954; Stigler, 1951; Bucklin, 1965, 1970). In fact, in the case of perfect competition, 
costs will ultimately determine channel structure and consequently the institutional 
set up. In other market structures, effectiveness and/or equity are also important 
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criteria for building a structure of marketing institutions. Various studies 
emphasising marketing efficiency as a criterion for the channel structure have also 
included effectiveness as a criterion (e.g. Bucklin, 1965; Bucklin, 1966). Models 
from management science (see for instance Lilien et al., 1992, p.415, ff.; Stern and 
El Ansary, 1992, p.304, ff.) analyse channel structure by focusing on the relationship 
between a profit maximising manufacturer and a retailer under different assumptions 
about the degree of integration, the type of market structure, the profit function of 
the manufacturer and the profit sharing arrangement. 
The organisational dynamics school of thought in marketing, which analyses 
marketing channels from the behavioural point of view, has also contributed to the 
understanding of marketing institutions. Initiated by Stern (1969), marketing 
channels have been analysed on the basis of power (e.g. Brown, et al., 1995), 
conflict and satisfaction in the relationship between channel partners. Frameworks 
for the analysis of marketing channels have been proposed (Stern and Reve, 1980). 
Marketing channels have been classified on the basis of the relationships in the 
channel, for example vertical marketing systems are classified in administered, 
contractual and corporate systems (Stern and El Ansary, 1992). Transaction cost 
economics has been widely used to understand marketing channels (Rindfleisch and 
Heide, 1997). 
The coordination between marketing institutions in a marketing channel has been 
analysed (Celly and Frazier, 1996). Much attention is paid to franchising, for 
example its motivation by the "resource constraints" or by the "incentive" argument 
(Lafontaine and Kaufmann, 1994). Factors determining continuity in channel 
relationships (Anderson and Weitz, 1989), and trust in marketing channels 
(Geyskens, et al., 1998; Kumar, et al., 1995) have been investigated. Theories on 
marketing channels and marketing institutions are by definition relevant to VMIs. 
They offer in particular insights into the process of establishing a VMI and the 
relationship of VMIs with participating enterprises. 
4 CRITERIA FOR ANALYSING VOLUNTARY MARKETING INSTITUTIONS 
4.1 VOLUNTARY MARKETING INSTITUTIONS, A CLASSIFICATION SCHEME 
VMIs take an intermediate position on the spectrum of marketing institutions: 
Government-owned marketing institution — Government controlled marketing 
institution — Government-supported common marketing institution — Voluntary 
marketing institution(VMI) — Individual company. They can be classified by 
criteria related to organisation and policy. On the basis of the present types of VMIs 
we suggest the following: 
organisational criteria 
• horizontal versus vertical VMI, e.g. farmers marketing cooperative versus a 
wholesaler sponsored voluntary chain; 
• hierarchy of VMIs, one-, two-..multilayer structure, e.g. a primary marketing 
cooperative set up by farmers versus a secondary national marketing cooperative 
established by regional cooperatives; 
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• purely voluntary versus hybrid (voluntary and public) VMI, e.g. a cooperative 
established by farmers versus a commodity board based on public law but 
established by majority vote of the representatives of an industry; 
policy related criteria 
• permanent versus temporary VMI, e.g. farmers' cooperative (intentionally 
permanent) versus a temporary marketing organisation set up by a group of 
enterprises to explore a new market. 
• strength of the link between a VMI and its target enterprises, e.g. a relatively 
loose relationship between retailers and wholesalers in a wholesaler sponsored 
voluntary chain versus a strict relationship in a franchise organisation. 
• degree of VMI-involvement in marketing a product, e.g. marketing cooperatives 
being in charge of the complete marketing operation of a product versus a 
promotional board taking responsibility for promoting the generic product only. 
These classification criteria seem helpful in understanding the role of a VMI in a 
food marketing system. However, they are descriptive and not instrumental for 
assessing the viability of a VMI. In the following section we propose criteria for 
assessing VMIs. 
4.2 CRITERIA FOR THE VIABILITY OF A VOLUNTARY MARKETING 
INSTITUTION 
Enterprises can transfer their complete marketing operation to a VMI, or specific 
aspects of the marketing operation only, such as aspects related to product, price, 
information/communication, or distribution. Decision-making on that matter can use 
concepts and theories from economics and marketing, as reviewed in section 3. It 
may also profit from assessing the viability of a VMI according to the following 
criteria. We distinguish necessary and sufficient conditions for the viability of a 
VMI (Meulenberg, 1986). Necessary conditions are conditions to be fulfilled in 
order to make a VMI meaningful. In addition to the necessary conditions a number 
of sufficient conditions, not necessarily all, have to be met in order to make a VMI 
viable. 
Necessary conditions for the viability of a VMI. 
Condition I: Products/needs of enterprises sewed by a VMI are homogeneous. 
VMIs are viable only if they offer products and services which suit the participating 
enterprises, e.g. the members of a cooperative. Consequently, enterprises served by a 
VMI should be homogeneous with respect to the marketing object of a VMI, say the 
product of the enterprises or specific product attributes only, such as nutritional 
aspects. This condition will be met in many agricultural markets, but is increasingly 
a problem in food markets because of product differentiation. Nevertheless, 
differentiated food products may also be homogeneous for specific attributes, such 
as the environmental friendliness or healthiness of a product, at least from the 
consumers' point of view. 
Condition 2: There are market opportunities and/or threats for the "generic" 
product of enterprises related to a VMI. 
Without opportunities and/or threats for the generic product there is no reason for 
enterprises to join a VMI. In food marketing systems this condition seems almost 
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always to be fulfilled; markets for many generic products, such as bread, poultry 
meat, beef, etc., are dynamic. 
Condition 3: Marketing by a VMI is superior to marketing by individual enterprises 
on either efficiency, effectiveness, or equity. 
Marketing is a basic function of every enterprise. However, an enterprise may 
transfer the marketing function fully or partially to a VMI if this transfer increases 
its profits. It requires superior marketing by a VMI either on efficiency (costs), 
effectiveness (sales) or equity (share of profit). 
These "necessary" conditions for viability of VMIs are often met in food marketing 
systems because of product-similarity between enterprises and the importance of 
small and medium sized enterprises. 
Sufficient conditions for the viability of a VMI. 
Condition 1: Enterprises prefer to respond jointly instead of individually to market 
opportunities and threats. 
In a free market economy an enterprise is responsible for marketing its products and 
services. Whether an enterprise will outsource marketing functions to a VMI 
depends among other things on its size and the related economies of scale and scope 
in marketing. However, even when a joint marketing operation through a VMI could 
be more effective, an enterprise might prefer its own approach for reasons of 
independence and flexibility. For instance, a food company might prefer to carry an 
own environmentally friendly brand instead of using an industry-wide 
environmental label. 
Condition 2: The product marketed by a VMI is important for the income formation 
of the related enterprises. 
An enterprise will not be motivated to join a VMI if the product in question only 
contributes to a minor extent to its income. 
Condition 3: Free rider problems are negligible. 
Enterprises hesitate to join a VMI, e.g. a promotional board, if non-participants will 
profit from that VMI too. 
5 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGES RELEVANT TO VOLUNTARY MARKETING 
INSTITUTIONS 
Developments of VMIs in Western food marketing systems, such as marketing 
cooperatives and marketing boards, depend on trends in the environment of western 
food marketing systems. We will highlight the main trends and their consequences 
for food marketing systems. 
Economic environment. In spite of steadily increasing income levels in Western 
countries, the per capita consumption of food (in volume) remains stable. Income 
elasticities of the demand for various food products are small. Income elasticities of 
the demand for food quality and services are higher. The tendency towards a more 
skewed income distribution offers opportunities for market segmentation and 
product differentiation in many western countries. 
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Economie developments suggest that farmers and food enterprises should reinforce 
their market position by increasing added value and by focusing on specific target 
groups. 
Demographic environment. The EU population is expected to increase only 
slightly in the period 1995 to 2000 (from 371.5 million to 375.0 million) and is even 
projected to decrease in the first half of the next century. On the other hand the 
global population is still expected to grow substantially. People in western countries 
are living longer. However, the food consumption pattern of old people does not 
differ substantially from that of the rest, except for a lower and nutrient poorer food 
intake, lower energy need and more need for services (Senauer, et al., 1991). The 
trend towards smaller families, in which both partners have a job, stimulates the 
demand for convenience foods and "away from home" consumption. These 
demographic trends also stimulate marketing strategies of increased added value 
(services) to the product and of focusing on specific target groups. 
Social environment Trends in values and lifestyles have a great impact on food 
marketing. From the well-known list of trends proposed by Popcorn (1992), "fantasy 
adventure, save our society, small indulgence and staying alive" seem particularly 
relevant to food consumption. New values, such as "self fulfilment ethic", "better 
quality of life", and "work to live" (Plummer, as quoted by Engel, et al., 1995, 
p.627) influence food consumption. Concern about the environment and about 
animal welfare affect food marketing not only through consumers' wants and needs, 
but also through actions of consumer groups and environmental lobbies. 
Changes in lifestyle due to more women working outside the home, increasing 
mobility and more free time influence consumer behaviour. Trends in values and 
lifestyles bring product positioning, product innovation and adding more services to 
the product to the forefront of food marketing. 
Physical environment. Ecological problems have become a major social issue. 
Many consumers are environmentally conscious, but do not behave in an 
environmentally friendly way. Environmentally friendly behaviour is promoted in 
particular by environmental lobbies and consumer groups. Ecological problems are 
acute in some agricultural sectors, e.g. manure problems in pig and poultry raising, 
use of pesticides/insecticides in horticulture, and land degradation in arable farming. 
The present wave of biotechnological inventions reinforces discussions about the 
sustainability of food systems. 
Food marketing will have to pay more attention to the sustainability of the food 
marketing system. It will increasingly approach sustainability as an opportunity and 
not as a threat. 
Political environment. Fewer trade barriers and less market intervention, combined 
with more involvement in environmental and health issues are trends in government 
policies with respect to food marketing. Member countries of GATT/WTO are 
committed to a reduction of market intervention, to improved market access 
(replacement of non-tariff barriers by "equivalent" tariffs and reduction of tariffs) 
and reduction of subsidised exports. The future EU membership of some middle and 
east European states will shift the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) further from 
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market intervention to income support. The CAP will pay more attention to rural and 
environmental policies. 
Food marketing systems are becoming more market oriented and rely less on market 
support from government. 
Technological environment. Technological advances in IT (information 
technology), computer science, biotechnology, and transportation offer new 
opportunities to food marketing. New information technologies improve the speed 
and precision of exchange processes. Computerisation of production and logistical 
processes reduces costs. Biotechnological inventions create opportunities for new 
products. However, many Western consumers are suspicious about food produced 
by modern biotechnological methods. 
Advances in technology increase marketing efficiency and stimulate product 
innovation in food marketing systems. Consumer bias against new sophisticated 
methods of food production and marketing increases the importance of 
communication and company-image in food marketing. 
6 CHANGING ENTERPRISES AND STRATEGIES IN FOOD MARKETING 
SYSTEMS 
Changes of enterprises in food marketing systems affect the potential role of VMIs. 
They result from environmental trends, but also from endogenous developments in 
enterprises themselves, such as technological inventions and new management 
techniques. In spite of the variety in Western food marketing systems, the 
developments in retailers, food manufacturers, wholesalers and farmers, show 
similar trends. Major trends that are relevant to VMIs will be discussed briefly in 
this section. 
6.1 CHANGING ENTERPRISES 
Food retailers. Trends in European food retailing result from policies aimed at 
higher effectiveness and efficiency. The organisational structure of retail enterprises 
has changed in conjunction with these policies. 
• Marketing effectiveness of food retailers has been increased by market oriented 
retail policies. Width and depth of product assortment are cornerstones of such 
policies. They characterise to a large extent the store type, such as hypermarket, 
supermarket, discount store and speciality shop. A focus on specific target 
markets, and a constant search for new products and services are characteristic of 
modern food retailing. Private labels have become an important marketing 
instrument of retailers. In the past a cheap alternative to national brands, they are 
currently positioned as products of good quality, which are substantially cheaper 
than national brands. Retailers also try to improve marketing effectiveness 
through new assortments, better services or new outlets such as food shops in 
petrol- and railway stations and on the Internet. 
• Marketing efficiency is extremely important in a highly competitive Western 
food retail market. Costs of carrying a large number of items per store (Aldi has 
about 600 lines, Sainsbury and Tesco stores between 10,000 and 20,000 lines 
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(Corstjens and Corstjens, 1995, p.197)) make logistical efficiency of paramount 
importance. Advances in IT, such as the use of bar-codes, scanning at check-outs 
and electronic data interchange, contribute to efficient logistics. Contracting-out 
of logistical functions has decreased logistical costs too. The drive for efficiency 
has also stimulated a purchasing policy of obtaining price discounts. The strong 
bargaining power of retail chains vis-à-vis food suppliers is instrumental in this 
respect. 
• Organisational structure of food retailing is changing. Food retailing has shifted 
from small independents, such as grocery stores and greengrocers, to large retail 
chains. Some retail chains are members of a holding enterprise. Small 
independents try to stay in business either as a speciality shop, as a member of a 
wholesaler sponsored voluntary chain, such as Spar, as a member of a retailer 
sponsored voluntary chain, or by participating in a franchise organisation. 
Food industry. The European food industry has been characterised by Linda (1988) 
as widely diversified in the form of product extensions, geographic diversification 
and functional diversification. Innovation, mergers and joint ventures are means to 
materialise the diversification process. At present many food manufacturers try to 
build a competitive position in international markets on the basis of their core 
competencies in production and marketing. 
While multinationals such as Danone, Kraft, Nestlé and Unilever have been 
operating on an international scale for a long time already, a great many other food 
enterprises, which have traditionally set up production plants and management 
facilities in the domestic market only, are now also internationalising their 
businesses. A case in point are dairy cooperatives such as MD foods in Denmark, 
Sodiaal in France, Campina-Melkunie in the Netherlands and Avonmore in Ireland. 
In spite of the concentration and internationalisation in the European food industry a 
great many small and medium sized food manufacturers (SME's) remain competitive 
by focusing on market niches, by serving regional markets or by producing under a 
private retailer label. 
Wholesale companies. As a result of concentration and specialisation in food 
marketing systems the need for some wholesale functions, such as assembling, has 
diminished. Retail chains have integrated the execution of other functions, such as 
regrouping. For example, sorting and collection of eggs upstream in the marketing 
channel disappeared with the advent of specialised poultry farms. Allocation and 
assortment of groceries, traditional functions of wholesalers, have been taken over 
by distribution centres of large retail companies. 
Wholesalers have responded in different ways to market opportunities and threats. 
Distributive wholesalers have integrated food retailing, e.g. wholesaler sponsored 
voluntary chains. Wholesalers in commodities, such as merchants of grain, have 
become global players. Other wholesalers stay in business as agents of specific food 
manufacturers or food chains. Specialisation in particular wholesale functions, such 
as Cash and Carry, is another type of response to market opportunities and threats. 
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Wholesalers are not only challenged by concentration and specialisation in food 
marketing systems. Technological innovations and new types of food outlets also 
create opportunities and threats. 
Farmers. Concentration and specialisation are main trends in Western agriculture. 
Large specialised farms have emerged in the production of wheat, milk, pigs, 
broilers and horticultural products. This trend towards concentration and 
specialisation is still continuing. Partly in response to the predominant position of 
specialised commercial farms, mixed farming is experiencing a revival, particularly 
in the production of organic and regional foods. This development has been 
stimulated not only by the needs and wants of environmentally conscious consumers 
but also by rural planning policies. 
6.2 STRATEGIES OF FOOD MARKETING SYSTEMS 
Changes of food marketing systems and their environment go together with a shift 
from "selling commodities" to "marketing products". In this context food marketing 
systems increasingly operate on the basis of well defined strategies. Basic strategies 
have become: 
• Market orientation, " ...the organization wide generation of market intelligence, 
pertaining to current and future customer needs, dissemination of the 
intelligence across departments, and organization wide responsiveness to it" 
(Kohli and Jaworski, 1990, p.6), 
Market segmentation by targeting consumers with specific needs and wants; 
companies often strive for market leadership in chosen target markets, 
Product differentiation on the basis of specific attributes of products and 
services, 
Innovation in order to serve changing consumer wants and needs and to 
capitalise on technological inventions, 
Policy coordination between decision makers of a food marketing system, chain 
strategies, 
Internationalisation of businesses in order to realise necessary economies of 
scale and scope in production and marketing, in particular with respect to the 
exploitation of core competencies. 
7 THE IMPACT OF CHANGES IN THE STRATEGIES AND ENVIRONMENT 
OF FOOD MARKETING SYSTEMS ON VOLUNTARY MARKETING 
INSTITUTIONS 
Changes in the environment, enterprises and strategies of food marketing systems 
have been reviewed briefly in the previous sections. Their impact on the viability of 
VMIs will be discussed in this section. In this context we will make use of the 
criteria proposed in section 4. 
7.1 THE IMPACT OF CHANGING STRATEGIES ON VMIS. 
Market orientation. Market orientation implies that marketing plays a central role 
in policies of agricultural and food companies. Therefore, VMIs responsible for 
marketing the products of participating enterprises should acquire a leading role in 
determining quality and quantity of product supply. However, the willingness of 
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enterprises to accept a leading role of VMIs is negatively correlated with size of 
enterprise: bigger enterprises are more able and willing to respond in their own way 
to market opportunities and threats. Consequently, market orientation makes VMIs 
less viable vis à vis large enterprises, but reinforces their role for small enterprises, 
which lack the necessary marketing skills. It makes moral hazard in the relationship 
between a VMI and participating enterprises a more serious issue, since the 
reliability of enterprises' product supply to the VMI is crucial for marketing success. 
Market segmentation and product differentiation. Marketing policies of market 
segmentation and product differentiation by individual enterprises increase the 
heterogeneity of an industry. As a result, the condition "products/needs of 
enterprises served by a VMI are homogeneous" will be less easily fulfilled. 
However, small enterprises, having limited marketing capacities, might use a VMI 
as a vehicle for policies of market segmentation and/or product differentiation. 
Producers' groups are a case in point. 
Innovation. Many food companies have become big enough to adopt a policy of 
product innovation, which is some type of product modification. This development 
diminishes the viability of VMIs: the conditions "products/needs of enterprises 
served by a VMI are homogeneous" and "enterprises prefer to respond jointly 
instead of individually to (specific) market opportunities and threats" are not easily 
fulfilled. 
On the other hand, enterprises become increasingly aware that basic research paves 
the way for a continuous stream of new products. In spite of ongoing concentration 
in food marketing systems, many enterprises are still too small, or even do not want 
to engage in basic food research. As a result, there is a common need for basic 
research and a willingness to consider collective action. Therefore, a VMI in charge 
of basic research might be viable in spite of increasing product heterogeneity due to 
product innovation. 
Policy coordination / chain strategies. Serving consumers by offering specific 
products and services requires effective policy coordination in the food chain. In 
fact, chain marketing (i.e. a coordinated marketing policy of two or more subsequent 
enterprises in a food chain) is receiving much attention. VMIs can perform 
coordination tasks, but big enterprises, such as retail enterprises, often prefer to carry 
out such tasks themselves, also if coordination concerns one aspect of a marketing 
strategy, such as product quality, only. However, when many small enterprises 
participate in a food chain, a VMI can be instrumental in coordinating their 
strategies, e.g. a wholesaler sponsored voluntary chain. Under such circumstances 
the condition of "products/needs of enterprises served by a VMI are homogeneous" 
is fulfilled by the very mission of the VMI, namely the development and 
implementation of a uniform marketing strategy of the participating enterprises. 
Franchise organisations are a case in point. 
Internationalisation. Many VMIs serve enterprises of a specific country or region. 
Commodity boards and farmers' cooperatives are an example. However, 
international enterprises with foreign subsidiaries have a broader scope and are not 
interested in nationally oriented VMIs. As a result the condition for a viable VMI, 
"products/needs of enterprises served by a VMI are homogeneous", will not be met. 
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A solution to this problem is internationalisation of VMIs. VMIs with an 
international membership are scarce at present, but will become more important, e.g. 
farmers' cooperatives with an international membership. 
7.2 THE IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL TRENDS ON V M I S 
Trends in the environment of food marketing systems influence VMIs through their 
influence on food marketing strategies. From that point of view their impact has 
been discussed in the previous section. However, the following trends create 
opportunities for VMIs, irrespective of the distinguished food marketing strategies: 
• increasing concern about health and safety in relation to agricultural and food 
products, 
• increasing concern about ethical and social issues related to agriculture and food 
production, 
• increasing concern about the sustainability of agriculture and food production. 
These trends often concern the generic product. For instance: consumers are worried 
about the cholesterol content of eggs or about pesticide residues on fresh fruit and 
vegetables; society is suspicious about the ecological consequences of genetically 
manipulated plants and animals; many people are critical of the environmental 
pollution caused by some types of animal husbandry. 
Food marketing systems have to respond to such trends by developing products and 
procedures which are socially acceptable. VMIs can be instrumental in this respect 
by defining criteria and controlling their implementation. Examples include VMIs 
which develop and implement environmental labels; VMIs in charge of decreasing 
the amount of package waste; or VMIs which define and control the implementation 
of animal welfare criteria. Such VMIs seem viable since all enterprises of an 
industry face the same generic problem, which can effectively be handled by a 
collective approach. However, instead of joining a VMI some big enterprises prefer 
to adopt their own individual approach to such generic problems, the reason often 
being to support their own enterprise and brand image. 
Many VMIs that take care of marketing problems resulting from societal concern 
about the production and marketing of a generic product, develop and implement 
behavioural rules for participating enterprises. In this respect they differ from 
"classical" VMIs, such as farmers' cooperatives, which actively participate in the 
marketing process. 
7.3 ASPECTS OF V M F S REACTION TO CHANGING STRATEGIES AND 
ENVIRONMENT 
VMIs, in particular big VMIs, challenged by a changing environment try to stay in 
business, even if their relevance for participating enterprises is decreasing. Goals 
and time path for transforming such VMIs have to be planned carefully, in order to 
avoid poor solutions, "too little, too late" or even a "mission impossible". For 
example, a cooperative auction cannot transform itself into a true marketing 
cooperative without a fundamental change in its management organisation. In fact, 
while big VMIs, challenged by a changing environment, appear to be well able to 
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adopt new technologies, they often seem to have big problems in changing their 
management organisation and business culture. 
The approach to transforming/adapting a VMI can, in analogy to the scheme of 
Visser and Hemerijck (1997, p.65,ff.; see section 3), be clarified by the criteria 
institutional importance (potential role of a VMI for the income formation of 
participating enterprises) and institutional capacities (capacities of a VMI in 
production and marketing), see Figure 11.2. 
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Figure 11.2 Adaptation /transformation of a VMI to a changing environment in relation to 
institutional importance and institutional capacities 
Finally it is interesting to note, that VMIs in responding to fundamental 
environmental changes sometimes evolve towards hybrid types of VMI. Examples 
include a farmers' cooperative owning a majority share in a limited company which 
has no direct formal link with cooperative members; an industrial research institute 
which is doing basic research for generic products on the basis of public-private 
partnership. 
8 CONCLUSIONS 
The above analysis of VMIs suggests the following conclusions. 
• The proposed conceptual framework is helpful for classifying VMFs, and 
assessing the viability of VMIs. 
• Many trends in Western food marketing systems, in particular the increasing 
number of medium-sized and big enterprises pursuing their own marketing 
policies, have a negative impact on the viability of VMIs. 
• VMIs still have opportunities in Western food marketing systems, by offering 
specific marketing services to enterprises that basically pursue their own 
marketing policies: a "facilitating" VMI; and by planning and implementing the 
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total marketing programme for the product of small enterprises: a "strategic" 
VMI. 
• There are increasing opportunities for VMIs that address marketing problems 
due to the externalities of food production and marketing. 
• VMIs evolve from VMIs having business relations with member enterprises 
only, to VMIs having business relations with both member and non-member 
enterprises. 
• Hybrid VMIs, such as public-private partnerships or cooperatives operating 
through limited enterprises, are becoming more important. 
NOTE 
Section 2 borrows heavily from Meulenberg and Viaene (1998) 
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